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ARGUMENT 
The claims dismissed by the District Court for BV's alleged lack of standing 
address the fundamental issue of whether the Utah and/or United States Constitutions 
require that a mortgagee receive written notice of a proposed assessment affecting 
property in which the mortgagee has a protected property interest. At the time of the 
proposed special assessment1 on the Talisman area, BV Lending was the beneficiary of a 
deed of trust (i.e., mortgage) secured by certain property within the Talisman area. There 
is no dispute that BV Lending's property interest was a legally protected property interest 
under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the underlying question in this case is 
whether the proposed assessment triggered the requirement for JSSD to provide notice 
reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise BV Lending of the proposed 
assessment and afford BV Lending an opportunity to present its objections. In other 
words, was BV Lending entitled to written notice of the proposed assessment before it 
was imposed, particularly given that the proposed assessment would prime BV Lending's 
perfected lien? The answer to this question is an unequivocal yes. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "prior to taking action which will 
affect an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a State must provide 'notice reasonably calculated, under all 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections.'" Mennonite Bd. v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 
1
 A "special assessment" is "[t]he assessment of a tax on property that benefits in some 
important way from a public improvement." Black's Law Dictionary 125 (8th ed. 
2004). 
1 
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(1983) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950)). In Mennonite, Justice O'Connor in dissent accurately described the majority 
ruling as follows: "Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decision and 
holds that before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected 
property interests of any party, the State must provide notice to that party by means 
certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity and location are 'reasonably 
ascertainable.'" Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As the 
majority stated, "[njotice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a 
minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the 
liberty or property interests of any party " Id. at 800. 
Here, there can be no genuine dispute that the assessment adversely affected BV 
Lending's property interest. The assessment lien, which now purportedly exceeds $29 
million, primed BV Lending's perfected interest in the Subject Property (and every other 
mortgagee's interest as well) and became a lien on par with a statutory property tax lien. 
Accordingly, under Mennonite, BV Lending was entitled to written notice of the 
proposed assessment before it was imposed—written notice that it never received. Id. 
Appellees contend that notice is required only where the government action might 
result in the property interest being immediately and drastically diminished. The 
Mennonite decision was not so limited. Nevertheless, even if a court were to apply the 
more stringent (and incorrect) legal standard suggested by Appellees, there is no question 
that the proposed Assessment in this case might have resulted in BV Lending's property 
interest being immediately and drastically diminished. In fact, in this case, the immediate 
2 
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and drastic diminishing of BV Lending's property interest has arguably already been 
proven as the District Court just recently ruled below that BV Jordanelle is obligated to 
pay the entire Assessment for the Talisman area in order to clear the assessment from its 
own property. In other words, although BV Jordanelle owns less than half of the 
property within Talisman—having acquired the property from its affiliate B V Lending— 
it is now required to pay the assessment for the entire Talisman property in an amount in 
excess of $29 million in order to keep its property. An owner who owns less than ten 
percent of the Talisman area likewise may be liable for the entire assessment. The day 
before the assessment was enacted B V Lending had a property interest in a portion of 
Talisman by virtue of its $7 million loan and its recorded trust deed, secured by property 
having an equivalent value. But when the assessment was enacted the next day, an 
assessment lien in an amount more than double what BV's property was allegedly worth 
and based on improvements to property that BV Lending had no interest in and received 
no benefit from primed BV Lending's interest. "Immediate" and "drastic" are apt 
descriptions of the impact of the assessment on BV Lending and the other mortgagees' 
respective interests in Talisman. Consequently, even under Appellees' incorrect 
standard, BV Lending was entitled to actual notice. 
The Utah Assessment Area Act (the "Assessment Act"), the Act under which the 
assessment at issue in this case was established, currently does not require the 
government to provide written notice to a mortgagee of a proposed assessment. Rather, 
the only persons entitled to notice under the statute are property owners. This omission is 
unconstitutional and BV's Notice Claims seek, in part, such a ruling from Utah's courts. 
3 
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All of this background information on BV's Notice Claims, including Judge 
Pullan's recent decision that BV Jordanelle is responsible for the assessment lien on the * 
entire Talisman area even though BV Jordanelle owns less than half of that property, is 
significant to the question of standing for numerous reasons. First, BV Lending has 
traditional standing. Because the Notice Claims stem from core constitutional 
violations, including a violation of BV Lending's due process rights, the District Court's 
denial of BV Lending's standing based on an alleged inability to redress BV Lending's 
injury was clear error. Not only do courts apply a less strict standard for redressability 
when addressing a procedural due process violation, but the District Court also failed to 
acknowledge that BV Lending may be entitled to monetary damages—even if 
nominal—or other relief not involving any specific performance with respect to the 
property or the assessment lien. BV Lending has a "stake" in this case separate from the 
ownership of the property. Moreover, even if BV Lending lacks standing, which it does 
not, then BV Jordanelle should be allowed to assert BV Lending's claims under the 
third-party standing doctrine. 
In any event, the intimate relationship between the BV entities—sister companies 
in which BV Jordanelle was created for the special purpose of holding the property at 
issue—and the BV entities long and continuing history with the property in question 
unequivocally demonstrates that the BV entities have a real and personal interest to fully 
and zealously advocate their position in this case. In other words, the BV entities 
clearly satisfy all policies underlying traditional standing. To the extent that the Court 
finds that BV Lending lacks traditional standing based on the District Court's alleged 
4 
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inability to redress its injuries, however, BV Lending and BV Jordanelle respectfully 
request that the Court simply allow BV Jordanelle twenty days from the Court's ruling 
to transfer the property back to BV Lending. The simplicity of this process, however, 
suggests to the B V entities that traditional standing in this case cannot be so narrowly 
construed, and that form cannot be elevated over substance. 
Second, the issues raised in this case create a classic scenario where alternative 
standing is warranted. As noted above and as recognized by the District Court below, 
B V Jordanelle is clearly an appropriate party to assert these claims. Furthermore, the 
issues sought to be raised in this case involve core constitutional rights affecting 
numerous private landowners in Utah, and are therefore of sufficient public importance 
to support alternative standing. B V is seeking a ruling that the Assessment Act is 
unconstitutional on its face because mortgagees are entitled to written notice of a 
proposed assessment before it is imposed. Such a determination is to be made by the 
judicial branch, and only the judicial branch. Appellees' arguments that the judicial 
branch is not best suited to address BV's alleged due process violations and the 
constitutionality of the Assessment Act defies logic and is contrary the very foundation 
of the separation of powers. John Marshall, the author ofMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
37 (1803), must be rolling over in his grave. Moreover, Appellees' suggestion that 
"sufficient public importance" is limited only to the specific facts of a few cases also is 
incorrect as such an argument ignores the underlying purpose of that prong for 
alternative standing. The resolution of the constitutional issues raised by BV may have 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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an impact on property rights and government practices beyond the confines of this case, 
and that is undoubtedly a sufficient public importance to confer alternative standing. 
I. BV LENDING HAS TRADITIONAL STANDING. 
The alleged defect defeating BV Lending's "traditional" standing to assert the 
Notice Claims is that BV Lending transferred the property to its affiliate, BV Jordanelle. 
According to the District Court, this transfer of the property "eliminated any stake [BV 
Lending] may have had in the outcome of these proceedings" and, thus, the District Court 
is allegedly unable to redress the constitutional violations claimed by BV Lending.2 This 
ruling was in error, and Appellees have provided the Court with no basis to support this 
ruling. 
The District Court's ruling on BV Lending's alleged lack of traditional standing 
has a fundamental flaw. The District Court and Appellees incorrectly assume that BV 
Lending has no "stake" in this case separate from the ownership of the property. This 
simply is not true. An individual's procedural due process rights are not contingent on 
that individual's continued "ownership" of the protected interest implicating those rights. 
For example, in Copelin-Brown v. New Mexico State Personnel Office, the facts showed 
that the terminated employee alleging a violation of her right to procedural due process 
would not have been eligible for continued employment with the government office. 399 
2
 As correctly recognized by the District Court, BV Lending satisfies the first two 
elements of traditional standing: injury and causation. (R. 1892.) The strained 
arguments by Appellees that BV Lending was somehow not injured when a priming lien 
supplanted its property interest without BV Lending having notice or the opportunity to 
be heard, or that BV Lending's request to strike the Area Act as unconstitutional is not 
causally connected to the due process claims (Appellees' Br. at 29-30) defies law and 
logic. 
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F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the New Mexico State Personnel Office 
argued that "a favorable ruling from the court would fail to redress her injury." Id. at 
1254. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that "even if Ms. Copelin-
Brown's dismissal was justified on the merits, her right to procedural due process entitles 
her to at least nominal damages." Id. (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 266); see also Citizens 
for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. ofAgric, 341 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
redressability requirement was met in the context of an injury for lack of notice under 
NEPA where plaintiff arguably could have influenced the decision of the United States 
Department of Agriculture had plaintiff been given an opportunity to be heard). In other 
words, even though Ms. Copelin no longer had a "stake" in her employment with the 
government office, that fact did not mean she no longer had standing to assert her claim 
for violation of her procedural due process rights. 
The same is true here. Although B V Lending no longer "owns" the property that 
was unlawfully assessed, BV Lending, like Ms. Copelin, still has the ability to assert its 
procedural due process claims in this case. This conclusion is further supported by the 
general proposition that a more relaxed standard of "redressability" is applied to claims 
for procedural due process violations. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
572 n.7 (1992) ("The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his 
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy."); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 ("Because the 
right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense that it does not depend upon the 
merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized 
7 
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society that procedural due process be observed, we believe that the denial of procedural 
due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.") 
(internal citation omitted); see also Brody v. Vill of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 112 (2d. 
Cir. 2003) ("In a procedural due process challenge, the question before the court is 
whether the process affording the plaintiff an opportunity to participate in governmental 
decision-making before being deprived of his liberty or property was adequate, not 
whether the government's decision to deprive the plaintiff of such liberty or property was 
ultimately correct."); Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 976 (finding that the 
redressability requirement was met in the context of an injury for lack of notice under 
NEPA where the plaintiff arguably could have influenced the decision of the United 
States Department of Agriculture had plaintiff been given an opportunity to be heard). 
BV Lending was entitled to notice of the proposed Assessment Ordinance and was 
entitled to be heard on the matter. BV Lending, like Citizens for Better Forestry, 
arguably could have influenced the Wasatch County Council had it been notice and an 
opportunity to be head. 
Appellees recognize that "a person's right to due process may be actionable even 
when there are nominal damages" but contend that BV does not seek nominal damages 
and that the relief requested "far exceeds the nominal damages purportedly allowed in the 
absence of actual injury . . . . " (Appellees' Br. at 31.) This argument is unpersuasive. 
First, Appellees appear to concede that BV Lending has standing to at least obtain 
nominal damages on its claims. Although BV Lending has not expressly requested 
"nominal damages" in its Complaint, it does request "such other and further relief as the 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court determines just and proper/9 which would clearly include nominal damages,, See 
Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[NJominal damages 'are not 
compensation for loss or injury, but rather recognition of a violation of rights.'" (quoting 
Redding v. Fairman, 111 F.2d 1105, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983)). Indeed the Calhoun Court 
recognized that "[although Calhoun does not specifically request nominal damages—as 
he did compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive and declaratory relief—his 
amended complaint contains a prayer for 'such other relief as it may appear plaintiff is 
entitled.5... Under these circumstances, Calhoun's prayer for 'such other relief can be 
reasonably viewed as a request for nominal damages." Id. at 943; see also Hynix 
Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1100 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
("Rambus also argues that Hynix and Nanya did not request nominal damages in their 
prayer for relief. Both Hynix and Nanya request 'such other and further relief as the 
Court may deem appropriate.' This general prayer suffices here to provide for nominal 
damages, if proven at trial."). Accordingly, BV Lending has traditional standing. 
Second, Appellees ignore the fact that BV has requested a declaratory judgment 
that the Assessment Act is unconstitutional. Third, the vindication of BV Lending's due 
process rights alone satisfies the "redressability" prong for traditional standing. See, e.g., 
Carey, 435 U.S. at 266-67 ("Because the right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in 
the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, 
and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be 
observed, we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for 
9 
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nominal damages without proof of actual injury.") (internal citation omitted).3 In short, 
BV Lending has traditional standing to assert the Notice Claims. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if this Court still believes that BV Lending's 
transfer of the property to BV Jordanelle precludes BV Lending from having traditional 
standing, BV Lending and BV Jordanelle respectfully request that the Court simply 
allow BV Jordanelle twenty days from the Court's ruling to transfer the property back to 
BV Lending. That apparently is all that is required to satisfy the District Court's 
redressability concerns. 
II. BV LENDING AND BV JORDANELLE SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF TRADITIONAL STANDING. 
The traditional standing test serves the purpose of avoiding potentially poor 
advocacy and avoiding unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues by parties who do 
not have sufficient incentive to fully develop the record and litigate the claims. 2006 UT 
74, ^ [ 20. Currently before the Court is the party that owned the property at the time of the 
assessment and was harmed by the priming lien (BV Lending), and the related party that 
currently owns the property and must pay the assessment or risk foreclosure (BV 
Jordanelle). BV Lending and BV Jordanelle, both individually and collectively, have 
every incentive in the world to prosecute their claims with vigor, and to protect their 
substantial economic investment. As such, both satisfy the requirements for traditional 
standing. 
3
 To the extent BV Lending needs to amend its claims to expressly request nominal 
damages in order to have standing, which it should not have to do, it is willing and 
capable to do so as the parties are only in the early stages of discovery in the underlying 
action. 
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Appellees attempt to argue that the purposes of standing are not met here because 
"[n]either party has a real or personal interest in the dispute or any incentive to fully 
develop all of the material and factual issues." (Appellees' Br. at 42.) Appellees argue 
that BV Jordanelle was not in existence at the time of the creation of the Assessment 
Ordinance and is thus not able to fully develop all the material facts, (id. at 39) and 
because "B V Lending no longer has an interest in the property and does not owe the 
assessment amounts, it is unable to fully develop all material facts related to the current 
amounts due and owing pursuant to the assessment lien" (id.). This argument, however, 
ignores the obvious fact that BV Lending and BV Jordanelle are sister companies with 
the same principles, decision-makers, office, coffee mugs, etc. Furthermore, the 
procedural history of this case, both in the underlying action and on appeal, should 
demonstrate both the motivation and the means of these entities to fully and zealously 
advocate their position in this case. Indeed, B V currently has over 29,000,000 reasons to 
vindicate their rights.4 
III. BVJ HAS TRADITIONAL STANDING. 
BVJ has traditional standing under the "third-party standing" doctrine. See, e.g., 
Hodakv. City of St. Peters, 535 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2008), cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1352 (2009) ("Third-party standing is an exception to the general rule that a plaintiff may 
only assert his own injury in fact and permits a litigant who lacks a legal claim to assert 
Appellees also attempt to argue that the policy considerations for standing are not met 
in this case because the issues should not be resolved by the courts but should be left to 
another branch of government. (Id. at 39-40.) As explained in more detail below, this 
argument is misplaced and ignores the very basis of BV's claims—the 
unconstitutionality of the Assessment Act. 
11 
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the rights of a third party."); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) 
(recognizing that a litigant may bring actions on behalf of third parties where the litigant 
has suffered an injury in fact, have a close relationship to the third party, and the third 
party has some hindrance to its ability to protect its own interests); 13 A Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.9 (3d ed. 1998) 
("The most common form of statement is that the rule against asserting the rights of 
others is a prudential rule that can be relaxed when the purposes of standing doctrine are 
served."). 
Appellees attempt to argue that the third-party standing rule does not apply 
because "BV Lending is a party to the lawsuit" and allegedly has no practical barrier in 
asserting its own rights. (Appellees' Br. at 35.) Once again, this argument ignores the 
obvious. If there was no barrier to BV Lending litigating its rights, then this discussion 
would be moot. However, according to the District Court and Appellees, BV Lending 
lacks the ability to assert its own claims in this case by virtue of its alleged lack of 
standing. The lack of standing is the "barrier" that satisfies that requirement under the 
third-party standing rule. 
Furthermore, Appellees' arguments based on Kemmerer Coal Company v. 
Brigham Young Universitylli F.2d 54, 57 (10th Cir. 1983) are also misplaced. {Id. at 
35-36.) Kemmerer states the general rule that a litigant may only assert his own 
constitutional rights or immunities. Kemmerer, 723 F.2d 54, 57 (10th Cir. 1983.) 
Appellees apparently ignore the fact that the third-party standing rule is an exception to 
this general rule. See Hodak, 535 F.3d at 904 ("Third-party standing is an exception to 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the general rule that a plaintiff may only assert his own injury in fact and permits a 
litigant who lacks a legal claim to assert the rights of a third party.")- Kemmerer is 
simply inapplicable. In any event, the parties in Kemmerer lacked the close relationship 
that exists here, where BV Lending and BV Jordanelle are closely related affiliates. If 
B V Lending lacks traditional standing in this case, then B V Jordanelle should have 
standing to assert BV Lending's claims under the third-party standing rule. 
Appellees also appear to suggest in their brief that BV's remedy in this case is not 
to sue them, but rather to obtain recovery from Old Republic Title Company, B V 
Lending's title insurer, for its failure to notice the Creation Resolution or disclose the 
existence of that resolution to BV Lending prior to the making of the loan to PWJ. 
(Appellees' Br. at 38.) BV has made demand upon Old Republic for defense and 
indemnity related to Old Republic's failure to discover or disclose the Creation 
Resolution in BV Lending's title policy. However, as of the date of this brief, Old 
Republic has flatly refused to provide BV with either a defense or indemnity, asserting 
that, pursuant to Vestin Mortgage, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2006 UT 34, 139 P.3d 
1055 (2006), neither the creation of a special improvement district nor the recordation of 
a notice of intention to create a special improvement district in the public records creates 
a defect, lien or encumbrance on title. Thus, the position of Old Republic—and the 
position of the Utah Supreme Court to the extent that Old Republic has accurately 
characterized the Vestin case—is diametrically opposed to Appellees' position on page 
41 of their brief that the recordation of the Creation Resolution in 2005 was really the act 
that led to the imposition of the assessment here. (See Appellees' Br. 41.) 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IV. BVJ HAS ALTERNATIVE STANDING. 
A party may "qualify for alternative standing if the party is (1) an appropriate 
party to bring suit and (2) the issue being presented is one of 'sufficient public 
importance to balance the absence of traditional standing criteria.5" City ofGrantsville v. 
Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, \ 16, 233 P.3d 461 {quoting Sierra 
Club, 2006 UT 74, *f 41). Here, there is no genuine dispute that BV Jordanelle is an 
appropriate party to assert the Notice Claims. The District Court found that "BVJ is an 
appropriate party as the obligor under the assessment ordinance and has the interest 
necessary to develop the legal and factual issues presented in this case " (R. 1889.) 
Appellees provide no persuasive arguments otherwise. Accordingly, the only question 
before the Court concerning alternative standing is whether the issues sought to be raised 
by B V in their Notice Claims are of sufficient public importance and should be addressed 
by the judicial branch. They are, and BV should be allowed to assert those claims. 
A. The Constitutional Issues Sought to be Raised are of Sufficient Public 
Importance. 
This case is about the protection of property and due process rights under the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. Specifically, the claims dismissed by the District Court 
address the fundamental issue of whether the Utah and/or United States Constitutions 
require that a mortgagee receive written notice of a proposed assessment affecting 
property in which the mortgagee has a protected property interest before the assessment 
is imposed. BV Lending's interest in its property within Talisman was a legally protected 
property interest under the Due Process Clause at the time of the proposed Assessment 
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Ordinance. However, BV Lending was not provided with written notice of the proposed 
Assessment Ordinance, and was not provided with an opportunity to be heard regarding 
the assessment. Appellees essentially argue that there is nothing for this Court or the 
District Court to address because Appellees allegedly complied with the Assessment Act 
in providing notice of the proposed assessment to those identified in the Assessment Act 
as requiring written notice; i.e., only property owners. {See, e.g., Appellees' Br. at 48.) 
Appellees, however, apparently misunderstand the fact that BV's Notice Claims are 
primarily premised on the argument that the Assessment Act is unconstitutional for the 
very reason that mortgagees and lienholders are not entitled to written notice under the 
statute. 
In determining whether the Assessment Act is unconstitutional, a court must 
determine whether the proposed assessment triggered the requirement for JSSD to 
provide notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise B V Lending of 
the proposed assessment and afford BV Lending an opportunity to present its objections 
prior to the assessment being imposed. As explained above, B V Lending was entitled to 
written notice under the standard outlined in Mennonite, as well as under the more 
stringent (and incorrect) standard argued by Appellees. {See Appellees' Br. at 46-47 
(relying on New Iberia.) The question of the Assessment Act's constitutionality is not 
currently before the Court. However, the question is relevant to standing in that it 
demonstrates that the issues raised are of sufficient public importance to warrant 
alternative standing for BV. 
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As noted in Trustees for Alaska v. State of Alaska, a case completely ignored by 
Appellees in their brief, the mere fact that BV's dismissed claims are constitutional 
claims may, in and of itself, satisfy the "sufficient public importance" prong of the test. 
736 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1987) ("[T]he case in question must be one of public 
significance. One measure of significance may that that specific constitutional 
limitations are at issue . . . That is not an exclusive measure of significance, however, as 
statutory and common law questions may also be very important") (emphasis added). 
The issues raised by BV here involve core constitutional rights centered on notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
Furthermore, the resolution of BV's Notice Claims may have a significant impact 
on every local government and landowner in the entire State of Utah. If BV prevails on 
their Notice Claims and the Assessment Act is found to be unconstitutional on its face for 
failure to require written notice to be sent to mortgagees, then the natural consequence is 
that the Assessment Act will need to be amended by the Utah Legislature to require 
written notice in conformance with due process. In other words, such a resolution would 
affect every special assessment to be levied by every governmental entity in the State of 
Utah.5 Such a far-reaching impact is certainly important to the public, especially in Utah 
where property rights and due process rights are held in such high esteem. See Utah 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 1 ("All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
5
 Curiously, Appellees argue that the Notice Claims raise only a "narrow issue dealing 
with a single landowner" and that the "issues do not truly impact land owners and local 
governments . . . . " (Appellees' Br, at 46.) Again, Appellees either misunderstand BV's 
claims and their request to strike the Assessment Act as unconstitutional or are simply 
choosing to ignore the obvious implications of this case. 
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their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right."); see also Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 606 
S.E.2d 464, 468 (S.C. 2004) (noting that "the issue in the present case is of sufficient 
public importance to confer standing. Resolution of the issues in this case will likely 
have an impact on government practices beyond the confines of the case itself.").6 
Ignoring these cases and constitutional provisions, Appellees attempt to limit the 
type of claims that are of "significant public importance" to actions where "they 
challenge industries that pose potential environmental and health-related harms to 
citizens of a county, for example the storage of hazardous waste." (Appellees' Br. at 44.) 
Such a limitation is unwarranted. Indeed, the District Court and the Appellees provide no 
6
 Although a ruling in favor of BV on their Notice Claims may have implications, 
Appellees' suggestion that "to deem the Act unconstitutional would undermine the very 
purpose of the Act, which is to allow counties to establish special improvement districts 
for the benefit of the citizenry," is just not true. (Appellees' Br. at 40.) BV simply 
contends that mortgagees and other reasonably ascertainable individuals holding a 
protected property interest should be provided written notice of a proposed assessment, 
a result that could be effectuated by simply amending the Assessment Act to require 
written notice be sent to those of record as identified through a simple title report. 
Further, a ruling in favor of BV on the merits of their Notice Claims would not 
undermine or vitiate the many assessments that have been imposed by other 
governmental entities under the Assessment Act in other jurisdictions at other times and 
under other circumstances. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Exxon Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm % 2010 UT 16, «fl0, 228 P.3d 1246, when a court "finds a statute 
unconstitutional or provides the correct interpretation or rule of law," it has "the 
equitable power to determine whether the new rule will be applied retroactively or 
prospectively and in doing so [will] 'seek a blend of what is necessary, what is fair and 
what is workable.'" (quoting Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 
(Utah 1984)). 
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explanation as to why the constitutional issues raised in the Notice Claims—issues which 
impact the rights of property owners and numerous government bodies—are somehow of 
lesser weight than the cases cited in the Order. As was stated in BV's initial brief, if the 
violation of a party's due process rights resulting in the loss of property and admittedly 
impacting the rights of countless other private property owners in the State of Utah is not 
an issue of "sufficient weight" or "sufficient public importance," it is hard to contemplate 
an issue that would ever rise to that level. 
The protection of property rights against government action in violation of the 
Utah and United States Constitution is of sufficient public importance to warrant 
alternative standing. Thus, the District Court should be reversed, and BVJ should be 
allowed to pursue the Notice Claims. 
B. The Notice Claims Are Best Addressed by the Judicial Branch. 
Perhaps the most obvious conclusion in this case is that the judicial branch, and 
only the judicial branch, should address the issues raised in the Notice Claims. See 
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^ j 36 (recognizing that a party asserting alternative standing 
must demonstrate that the issues are not more appropriately addressed by another branch 
of government pursuant to the political process. 
BV is asking Utah's courts to determine whether their due process and other 
constitutional rights were violated in connection with the enactment of the Assessment 
Ordinance. As part of their Notice Claims, BV seeks a declaration from the Court that 
the Assessment Act is unconstitutional, primarily because it does not provide notice and 
an opportunity to be heard to mortgagees. Such an issue is to be addressed by the judicial 
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branch, and only the judicial branch. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 37 (1803). 
Appellees contend that "[t]he Utah Legislature has already determined the 
procedure a governmental entity must follow in creating a special improvement district 
and adopt an assessment lien." (Appellees' Br. at 48.) Thus, according to Appellees, 
BV's remedy lies with the Utah Legislature, and BV should simply petition the 
Legislature to amend the Assessment Act because the Legislature apparently is the 
branch of government that gets to decide what process is due and to whom. (Id.) This 
position is flawed. First, as recognized by Appellees, the Utah Legislature has already 
determined what it believes is appropriate notice under the Assessment Act. In other 
words, it is highly unlikely that B V or any other party will find any success in going 
directly to the Utah Legislature. Second, and more importantly, the judicial branch, not 
the legislative branch, is the body to determine the constitutionality of the laws. That has 
been the well-settled rule in this country for over 200 years. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 37 (1803). BV has asserted claims challenging the constitutionality of the 
Assessment Act, and these claims are to be addressed by the judicial branch. The issues 
could not be more appropriately addressed by another branch of government. 
For the reasons stated above, B V Jordanelle has alternative standing to assert the 
Notice Claims in this case, even if the Court does not find traditional standing. The 
District Court, therefore, must be reversed. 
7 
Finally, Appellees' arguments that BV's claims are barred for failure to contest the 
Assessment Ordinance within thirty days after it became effective, and that the Court 
therefore should affirm on the alternative ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
ignores the very basis of BV's due process claims and the undisputed allegations that 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the Order, and hold that BV 
Lending and BV Jordanelle have traditional standing, or at least BV Jordanelle has 
alternative standing, to assert the Notice Claims, and it should direct the District Court to 
address those claims on their merits. 
DATED this 10th day of July 2012. 
RAY QUINNEY &NEBEKERP.C. 
Michael R. Johnson 
Matthew M. Cannon 
Attorneys for BV Jordanelle, LLC and 
BV Lending, LLC 
BV had no notice of the Assessment Ordinance until well-over thirty days after it was 
enacted. (See Appellees' Br. at 49-50 (asserting the specious argument that, despite 
B V s lack of notice of the Assessment Ordinance that forms the basis of their due 
process claims, BV are somehow barred from raising their constitutional claims because 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-42-106 bars claims raised more than thirty-days after the effective 
date of the assessment ordinance)). Judge Pullan was not persuaded by this nonsensical 
argument below, and this Court should not be persuaded by it either. 
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